United States - Thailand Free Trade Agreement Negotiations: Potential Effects on Pharmaceutical Patent Protection in Thailand by Laohapakakul, Duangrat
 
United States - Thailand Free Trade Agreement Negotiations:
Potential Effects on Pharmaceutical Patent Protection in Thailand
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation United States - Thailand Free Trade Agreement Negotiations:
Potential Effects on Pharmaceutical Patent Protection in Thailand
(2006 Third Year Paper)
Accessed February 19, 2015 9:47:18 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:8889472
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAAMicrosoft Word 10.0.6612;
United States - Thailand Free Trade Agreement Negotiations: Potential Eﬀects on
Pharmaceutical Patent Protection in Thailand
Duangrat Laohapakakul
April 2006
This paper is submitted in satisfaction of both the course requirement and
the LL.M. written work requirement
1Abstract
Beneﬁts and losses that a country would get from entering into a free trade agreement are often controversial
and rise to national debate. This is especially apparent for negotiations between developed and developing
countries, where there are large discrepancies between the bargaining power and the policies on national
growth and development of each party. Numerous debates have dealt with the topics covered under the
current U.S. – Thailand Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations. One such topic is the contentious
negotiations on intellectual property rights regarding pharmaceutical patents. The negotiations will aﬀect
the level of pharmaceutical patent protection in Thailand, as the U.S. tends to negotiate for TRIPS-plus
protection. This paper discusses the potential impact of FTA negotiations on law and policies involving
pharmaceutical patents in Thailand, an issue which has a direct eﬀect on the Thai public heath system. By
focusing the discussion on Thailand’s perspective, Part I of the paper provides background information on
the current status of the FTA negotiations. Part II examines the international and Thai legal regime on
pharmaceutical patent protection. Part III analyzes the major potential issues that the U.S. might propose
through FTA negotiations regarding pharmaceutical patent protection and their impact on Thailand. Since
the FTA is currently in the negotiation phase, I discuss the issue by analyzing the TRIPS Agreement position
as well as the FTA that the U.S. has entered into with Singapore, as it is the model FTA that the U.S.
will use for negotiations with other member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The
conclusion then develops proposals for Thailand’s negotiating position.
Introduction
Since the U.S. – Thailand Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations began on June 28, 2004,1 the Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs), academia, media and all other relevant sectors have raised extensive
debates on the beneﬁts and losses that Thailand would face as a result of the negotiations. On June 10,
1Raymond J. Ahearn and Wayne M. Morrison, U.S. – Thailand Free Trade Agreement Negotiations (2004),
http://www.thaifta.com/english/index eng.html (follow “USA” hyperlink; then follow “U.S. – Thailand Free Trade Agree-
ment Negotiations” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
22006, public concern again became apparent as nearly ten thousand protesters clashed with the police and
stormed the Sheraton Hotel, Chiang Mai, Thailand, where the sixth round of negotiations took place. With
a majority from the HIV/AIDS groups, protesters determined to stop the negotiations on pharmaceutical
patent and other intellectual property rights issues. “We are ﬁghting against drug patenting with our lives.
I know I might get arrested or injured in clashes with police, but we are all willing to face that, because we
have more to lose if the talks succeed,”2 said of one of the protesters.3
On the outset, FTAs are a bilateral approach to free trade that generally aims “to eliminate tariﬀ and
non-tariﬀ barriers (NTBs) in order to enhance market access between trading partners.”4 Countries often
enter into FTA negotiations with the hope of increasing their economic growth opportunities through trade
liberalization. However, there are costs incurring from free trade.5 With the large discrepancies in the
growth and development level of countries around the world, free trade negotiations tend to start oﬀ from
an unequal playing ﬁeld. Business sectors, industries or countries which are not well prepared may not be
able to compete in the open market.
The spread of the FTA is attributed in part to the slow progress of multilateral liberalization by the World
Trade Organization (WTO).6 It is thought that the U.S. has actively utilized bilateral and regional FTA
mechanisms because the Doha round of negotiations under the WTO have not reached much conclusion
and issues negotiated were not main interests of the U.S.7 A few examples of the FTAs that the U.S. have
concluded are the North American Free Trade Agreement and the bilateral agreements entered with Chile,
2Pennapa Hongthong, FTA TALKS: Protesters Storm Trade Negotiations, Jan. 11, 2006,
http://www.ftawatch.org/cgi-bin/content/newse/show.pl?0282 (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
3Id.
4Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI), Thailand-US Free Trade Agreement 7 (2003), http://www.us-
asean.org/us-thai-fta/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
5Department of Trade Negotiations, http://www.thaifta.com/english/index eng.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2006).
6Id.
7Jukkrit Kuanpoth, Khwˆ amp¸ cnmˆ a kˆ ıeowkab kˆ an` ehadtham kh¸ ctkˆ ankhˆ as¸ crˆ ı thai-saharadam¸ crikˆ a [Background towards the
Preparation for Thailand-U.S.Free Trade Area], http://www.ftawatch.org/autopage1/show page.php?t=2&s id=7&d id=7
(last visited Mar. 20, 2006).
3Jordan and Singapore.8
The U.S. has also started bilateral FTA negotiations with Thailand. The U.S. – Thailand FTA, which covers
a total of twenty-three trade topics, is considered the most comprehensive FTA agreement that Thailand
has ever negotiated.9 One of the most contentious topics is the issue of intellectual property rights regarding
pharmaceutical patent protection, as the U.S. tends to negotiate for TRIPS-plus provisions10. Main concerns
are drawn from the AIDS activists, as Thailand is now subsidizing access to AIDS treatment for nearly eighty
thousand of an estimated one hundred and seventy thousand patients who currently need AIDS treatment.
Such treatment is made possible with the low cost generic competition for ﬁrst-line AIDS medicines.11 The
cost of treating patients with anti-retroviral drugs is around ten thousand Baht a month for a patented drug,
while drops to just one thousand two hundred Baht for generic drugs.12 Thus, it is crucial for Thailand to
assess and understand the potential impacts that the FTA negotiations will have on Thai pharmaceutical
patent protection beforehand, in order for it to reach a more appropriate negotiation position that corre-
sponds to the level of development of the country.
This paper will discuss the potential impact of FTA negotiations on law and policies involving pharmaceuti-
cal patents in Thailand, an issue which has a direct eﬀect on the Thai public heath system. By focusing the
discussion on Thailand’s perspective, Part I of the paper provides background information on the current
status of the FTA negotiations. Part II examines the international and Thai legal regime on pharmaceutical
patent protection. Part III analyzes the major potential issues that the U.S. might propose through FTA
8More details of the FTAs are available at Office of the United States Trade Representative, Bilateral Trade Agreements, http://www.ustr.gov/Trade Agreements/Bilateral/Section Index.html
(last visited Mar. 25, 2006).
9Nitya Pibulsonggram, Process and Progress of Thailand – U.S. FTA Negotiations, Nov. 22, 2004,
http://www.thaifta.com/english/index eng.html (follow “USA” hyperlink; then follow “Process and Progress of Thailand-US
FTA Negotiations, Banyan Tree Hotel, 22 November 2004” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
10Provisions that contain more stringent rules than those minimum requirements stated under the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) are often called the “TRIPS-plus” provisions. See Hunton
& Williams LLP, Thailand –US FTA: A Roadmap to Negotiations 61 (2003), http://www.thaifta.com/ftaus roadmap.pdf
(last visited Mar. 15, 2006).
11Bilaterals.org, Myths and Realities: The Impact of the US-Thai FTA on Access to Medicines, Feb. 2, 2006,
http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id article=3711 (last visited Apr. 4, 2006).
12Reuters, Trade Deal Won’t Hit Thai Generic AIDS Drugs – U.S., May 4, 2005,
http://www.ftawatch.org/autopage1/show page.php?t=22&s id=1&d id=1 (last visited Mar. 25, 2006).
4negotiations regarding pharmaceutical patent protection and their impact on Thailand. Since the FTA is
currently in the negotiation phase, I will discuss the issue by analyzing the TRIPS Agreement position as
well as the FTA that the U.S. has entered into with Singapore, as it is the model FTA that the U.S. will use
for negotiations with other member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The
conclusion then develops proposals for Thailand’s negotiating position.
I.
Background of the U.S. - Thailand Free Trade Agreement Negoti-
ations
During the tenth Asia-Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation Leaders Meeting held in October 2002, President
George W. Bush announced the Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative (EAI) as a new U.S. trade initiative with
ASEAN.13 Under the EAI, the U.S. aimed to reach a network of bilateral trade agreement negotiations that
will increase trade and investment with the ASEAN countries.14
The U.S. – Thailand FTA negotiations were a result of the EAI.15 President Bush and Thai Prime Minister
Thaksin Shinawatra agreed on October 19, 2003 to negotiate a bilateral FTA, and subsequently on March 30,
2004 both parties announced that the negotiations would begin on June 28, 2004.16 The FTA was intended
not only to eliminate tariﬀs and non-tariﬀ barriers between the parties, but also to be a comprehensive one
13TDRI, supra note 4, at i.
14The White House, Fact Sheet on Free Trade and Thailand, Oct. 20, 2003,
http://www.thaifta.com/english/index eng.html (follow “USA” hyperlink; then follow “Fact Sheet on Free Trade and
Thailand” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
15TDRI, supra note 4, at i.
16Ahearn & Morrison, supra note 1.
5that covers a wide range of topics, such as investment, trade remedies, telecommunications and intellectual
property rights.17 It is likely to be based on the U.S. – Singapore FTA model, as suggested in the EAI.18
Before the negotiation started, Thailand was the U.S.’s nineteenth largest overall trading partner. The U.S.
was Thailand’s largest export market and second largest source of imports, while Thailand was the U.S.’s
twenty-third largest export market and sixteenth largest supplier of imports.19
The U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick’s notiﬁcation letter to the Speaker of the House and the Sen-
ate Majority Leader stated that the U.S. – Thailand FTA would beneﬁt the U.S. agricultural producers as
well as companies that export industrial goods and services by increasing export sales to Thailand. The FTA
will also help U.S. investors in Thailand by preserving the preferential status (national treatment) of U.S.
businesses.20 However, the FTA itself would have limited eﬀect on the overall U.S. economy as Thailand’s
economy is 1/100th in size comparing to that of the U.S.21 There were also beneﬁts for the U.S. foreign
policy for entering into the FTA, such as strengthening Thailand’s position as its key military ally in the
war of terrorism.22
For Thailand, incentives to negotiate an FTA with the U.S. were also centered on economic and political
considerations. Thailand was concerned that it not lose its export market share in the U.S. to other countries
and wanted to attract more investments into the country. It also looks forward to the transfer of skills and
technologies to increase its competitiveness. A tighter relation with the U.S. would also increase its leverage
among Southeast Asian countries.23
Currently, the U.S. and Thailand have completed six rounds of negotiations, the latest being held on January
17Pibulsonggram, supra note 9.
18TDRI, supra note 4, at i; Ahearn & Morrison, supra note 1.
19Economic Section, Royal Thai Embassy, The United States – Thailand Free Trade Agreement: Building Blocks for a Pros-
perous Future, http://www.thaifta.com/english/index eng.html (follow “USA” hyperlink; then follow “The United States –
Thailand Free Trade Agreement: Building Blocks for a Prosperous Future” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
20The White House, supra note 14.
21Ahearn & Morrison, supra note 1.
22Id.
23Id.
69-13, 2006.24 The U.S. has only proposed the issue of patent protection for negotiation during the sixth
round of talk.25 The pharmaceutical patent issue is one of the more contentious issues in the negotiation,
as it has long been anticipated that the U.S. will negotiate for TRIPS-plus level of intellectual property
protection.26
II.
Legal Regime on Pharmaceutical Patent Protection
As a background for analyzing the potential impacts of the U.S. – Thailand FTA negotiations on pharma-
ceutical patent protection in Thailand, I will ﬁrst examine the concept of patent protection as well as the
current international and Thai legal regime on pharmaceutical patent protection.
A.
Patent Protection
24Department of Trade Negotiations, Thailand-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, http://www.thaifta.com/ (last visited Mar. 28,
2006).
25Jiraporn Limpananont, FTA Watch pˆ oedphœi khøsanˆ oe l¿phonkˆ anwikhr ¸ rˆ uang sidthibad FTA thai-
saharad “...” [FTA Watch Discloses the Proposals and Analysis on Thai-U.S. FTA Patent],
http://www.ftawatch.org/autopage1/show page.php?t=3&s id=10&d id=10 (last visited Mar. 24, 2005).
26Pibulsonggram, supra note 9.
7What is a patent? No deﬁnition of a patent is given under the major international conventions like the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Convention) and TRIPS Agreement.27 The
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) described a patent as “an exclusive right granted for an
invention, which is a product or a process that provides, in general, a new way of doing something, or oﬀers a
new technical solution to a problem.”28 The general concept of a patent can be viewed as a bargain between
the inventors and the countries in which patent is applied for. The inventors are granted the exclusive rights
to their inventions for a period of time as a return for their inventions, while the countries can beneﬁt from
the disclosure of invention details.29
The necessity of a patent system is still debatable. In the course of history, the world has long prospered
technologically and inventors have developed inventions without a patent system.30 Concepts that justify
the purpose of patents such as the reward theory or natural right theory are still refutable.31 Nonetheless,
patent grants are mainly aimed to enhance the world advancement by creating incentives for research, data
disclosure, and the investment needed to assure that the invention is in fact developed and brought to the
market. Whether such beneﬁt would suﬃce their drawbacks primarily depends on their implication on the
particular industry sector and unique condition of each country.
The merit of the invention shifts the world’s justiﬁcation on the extent of patent protection.32 This is partic-
ularly signiﬁcant when a patent is being applied to the pharmaceutical industry. Granting a monopoly to the
pharmaceutical manufacturers may be detrimental to the public interest in some countries, while acceptable
in others. For those that are not, questions are raised whether other forms of compensation can be provided
27Jakkrit Kuanpoth, Kˆ odhmˆ aysidthibad n¿ewkhwˆ amkhid l¿ botwikhr ¸ [Patent Law: Idea and Analysis] 8 (2d ed. 2001)
[hereinafter Kuanpoth, Patent Law].
28Patents - Frequently Asked Questions, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/patentscope/en/patents faq.html#patent (last vis-
ited Mar. 29, 2006).
29Peter L. Kolker, TRIPS Agreement: Patent Protection 14 (2000).
30Nuno Pires de Carvalho, The TRIPS Regime of Patent Rights 1 (2d ed. 2005).
31Id. at 1-2; Kuanpoth, Patent Law, supra note 27, at 26-30.
32Carvalho, supra note 30, at 4.
8for the inventors, such as having the government subsidizes the cost of inventions or granting rewards for
innovations. As long as the world upholds the patent system, an appropriate balance between the rights of
the inventors and public interests in the context of a particular society must be closely considered. This is
to ensure that the system increases social welfare, and not destroy it instead.
B.
International Standards for Pharmaceutical Patent Protection
1.
International Protection of Intellectual Property Rights
As intellectual property is vulnerable to copying and spreading across borders, international protection
became vital for a comprehensive intellectual property protection system.33 Before the nineteenth century,
international protection on patent rights was granted only through a reciprocity principle under bilateral
agreements. The level of protection varied upon each negotiation.34 Accordingly, countries worked towards
a uniform international patent protection system and eventually agreed upon the Paris Convention, which
became eﬀective on July 7, 1884.35
Ideas and knowledge involving intellectual property rights later became an important comparative advantage
33Kuanpoth, Patent Law, supra note 27, at 219.
34Id. at 222.
35Id. at 223.
9for industrial countries to compete in the world market. A uniform rule on intellectual property protection
increased its importance as the countries linked the issue with international trade. The disparity in intel-
lectual property protection standards became a source of tension in international economic relations among
countries.36
In 1986, the industrialized countries pushed for the intellectual property rights issue to be discussed under
the Uruguay round trade negotiations of General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade.37 The results of the
Uruguay round trade negotiations were set forth in “The Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations” signed in Marrakesh in 1994. The Agreement Establishing the
WTO entered into force on January 1, 1995, and it incorporated the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, commonly known as the “TRIPS
Agreement”.38
The TRIPS Agreement includes ﬁve broad issues, which are:
“(1) how basic principles of the trading system and other international intellectual property
agreements should be applied;
(2) how to give adequate protection to intellectual property rights;
(3) how countries should enforce those rights adequately in their own territories;
(4) how to settle disputes on intellectual property between members of the WTO; and
(5) special transitional arrangements during the period when the new system is being
introduced.”39
36WTO, Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/agrm7 e.htm
(last visited Mar. 29, 2006) [hereinafter WTO, Intellectual Property].
37Kuanpoth, Patent Law, supra note 27, at 21.
38WTO, Legal Texts: The WTO Agreements, http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal e/ursum e.htm#nAgreement (last
visited Mar. 29, 2006).
102.
Protection of Pharmaceutical Patents under the TRIPS Agreement
As most countries in the world are now a member of the WTO,40 the minimum standard of intellectual
property rights protection set forth by the TRIPS Agreement has become the dominant rule that member
countries have to comply with. Inventions in the area of pharmaceuticals are granted patent protection
under the TRIPS Agreement,41 which attempts to achieve a balance between the long term objective of
providing incentive for research and development of new pharmaceutical products, and the short term
objective of making existing drugs to be available as much as possible.42
Under the TRIPS Agreement, patent protection must be uniformly available for any invention, whether
product or process, in all ﬁelds of technology, on the condition that such inventions are new, involve an
inventive step and are capable of industrial application.43 However, the TRIPS Agreement has speciﬁed
certain exceptions to the rule of patentable subject-matter which may be applicable to the pharmaceutical
practice. Exceptions to such rule include: “(1) inventions the prevention of whose commercial exploitation
is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
(2) diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals; and (3) certain
plant and animal inventions.”44
Patent protection must not expire before twenty years from the ﬁling date of the patent application.45 The
TRIPS Agreement does not allow the extension of the patent term to compensate for the delays in the
marketing of new pharmaceutical products due to the prolonged marketing approval from relevant health
43Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 27.1, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments – Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1197
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
44Id. at art. 27.2 & 27.3; WTO, Pharmaceutical Patents and the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 41.
45TRIPS, supra note 43, at art. 33.
11authorities.46
The area of rules most signiﬁcant to the developing and least-developed countries regarding a pharmaceu-
tical patent is the ﬂexibility the TRIPS Agreement provided for patent protection. The ﬂexibility, such as
exceptions to the exclusive rights, compulsory licensing and parallel importation, are the channels that make
it possible for countries to narrow down the level of patent protection in exchange for public health bene-
ﬁts. For instance, countries may allow pharmaceutical manufacturers to use patented inventions to obtain
marketing approval before the patent term expires, in order to shorten the time for launching new medicines
in the market.47 The TRIPS Agreement also allows compulsory licensing and government use of a patent
without the consent of the patent holder, subject to certain conditions.48
The concern that pharmaceutical patents may cause a negative impact on the access to aﬀordable medicines
and be detrimental to public health regime of developing and least-developed countries is shared by the world
community. Due to the rigid provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, certain member countries, especially those
developing and least-developed countries facing public health problems and epidemics, were uncertain about
the impact of the TRIPS Agreement on public health issues. They feared that they might have to face trade
retaliation if they utilized the ﬂexibility provisions. The 2001 Doha Declaration on TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health (Doha Declaration) clariﬁed the uncertainty by stressing that the TRIPS Agreement should
not deter members from taking measures to protect the public health. The interpretation and implemen-
tation of the TRIPS Agreement must be made in support of public health and promote accessibility to
medicines.49 Certain conclusions reached in the Doha Declaration include granting members freedom to
determine the appropriate ground for compulsory licenses and the exhaustion of intellectual property rights,
as well as emphasizing that a public health crisis may represent a national emergency or other circumstances
46WTO, Pharmaceutical Patents and the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 41.
47The example is also known as the Bolar provision. See WTO, Fact Sheet, supra note 42.
48See TRIPS, supra note 43, at art. 31.
49WTO, Fact Sheet, supra note 42.
12of extreme urgency.50
Another major development on the public health issue was the resolution of the so-called “Paragraph 6”
issue. On August 30, 2003, member countries agreed to allow countries to import cheaper generics made
under compulsory licensing if they are unable to manufacture medicines themselves. The obligation under
Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement that requires medicines produced under compulsory licensing be sup-
plied only in the domestic market were waived.51
C.
Pharmaceutical Patent Law in Thailand
1.
Background of Pharmaceutical Patent Protection in Thailand
Requests from domestic industries and the national policy in promoting industrial development and inter-
national trade were the early forces that drove Thailand to turn towards patent protection.52 As a civil law
country, Thailand must enact an Act in order to legitimately recognize patent rights. The Thai government
had ﬁrst proposed a draft patent act for consideration by the legislature in 1965, but it was refused because
of the fear that patent law would result in trade monopoly and an increased burden on consumers. The lack
50WTO, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Nov. 14, 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (2001),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/trips e/pharmpatent e.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2006); Id.
51WTO, Fact Sheet, supra note 42.
52Kuanpoth, Patent Law, supra note 27, at 21.
13of readiness in terms of manpower and facilities to accommodate the patent system was another concern of
the legislature.53
Patent protection in Thailand was eventually recognized through the enactment of the Patent Act B.E. 2522
(A.D. 1979) (1979 Act), which came into eﬀect on September 12, 1979.54 It was clearly speciﬁed under this
1979 Act that pharmaceutical products were not patentable.55 Only pharmaceutical processes were eligible
for patent protection, which corresponded to the level of pharmaceutical development of the country at that
time.56
During the 1980s-1990s, the U.S. government pressured Thailand to amend the patent protection granted
under the 1979 Act by tying trade retaliation measures to the protection of intellectual property rights.57
For instance, it cut Thailand’s Generalized System of Preferences for certain goods in January 1989 for the
reason that Thailand did not provide suﬃcient intellectual property protection to U.S. nationals, especially
on the protection of computer programs and pharmaceutical products.58 It also threatened to use Section
301 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 as a trade retaliation measure.59
As a result, Thailand amended the 1979 Act in 1992 on various important issues, including making pharma-
ceutical products patentable60. The amendment also set up mechanisms to monitor the price and availability
53Id. at 22.
54Id. at 22.
55Section 9 of the 1979 Act states that “The following inventions are not patentable: (1) food, beverage or phar-
maceutical products.” See Pharˆ atchabanyat sidthibad pho so 2522 [Patent Act B.E. 2522 (A.D. 1979)], available at
http://www.krisdika.go.th/lawHeadPDF.jsp?formatFile=pdf&hID=4 (last visited Apr. 4, 2006).
56Jiraporn Limpananont, Kh ¸ toklˆ ong kˆ ankhˆ as¸ crˆ ı thai-saharadam¸ crikˆ a kˆ ankhumkh ¸ ng sabsinthˆ angpanyˆ a kab phonkrathob t ¸
rabobyˆ a l¿ rabobsukkhaphˆ ab kh ¸ ng prath¸ ctthai [Thailand – U.S. FTA Agreement: Intellectual Property Protection and the Eﬀects
on Pharmaceutical and Health System in Thailand], http://www.ftawatch.org/autopage1/show page.php?t=3&s id=8&d id=8.
(last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
57Kuanpoth, Patent Law, supra note 27, at 22.
58Farnsworth (1989) “US Curbs Thai Goods”, New York Times, b.1, as cited in id. at 268.
59Kuanpoth, Patent Law, supra note 27, at 275-276.
60Section 4 of the Patent Act (No. 2) B.E. 2535 (A.D. 1992) amended Section 9 of the 1979 Act by removing pharmaceutical
products from one of the items that are not patentable. See Pharˆ atchabanyat sidthibad (chababthˆ ı 2) pho so 2535 [Patent Act
(No. 2) B.E. 2535 (A.D. 1992)], available at http://www.krisdika.go.th/lawHeadPDF.jsp?formatFile=pdf&hID=3 (last visited
Apr. 4, 2006).
14of drugs in the market,61 in order to prevent pharmaceutical patent holders from abusing their rights. How-
ever, such mechanisms were later revoked by the second amendment to the 1979 Act in 1999.62
2.
Current Pharmaceutical Patent Protection
On the international level, Thailand is not a party to any international treaty or convention regarding
patent protection, except for the TRIPS Agreement.63 The 1979 Act, which was amended twice respectively
in 1992 and 1999,64 is the domestic law governing pharmaceutical patent protection in Thailand. Currently,
the Patent Act recognizes protection of inventions, which include pharmaceutical products and processes.
An invention is patentable if: (1) it is a new invention; (2) it involved in higher inventive step; and (3) it is
capable of industrial application.65 The inventor might also choose to apply for a petty patent if criteria (1)
and (3) are met.66 However, the law does not allow the application for both a patent and a petty patent for
the same invention.67
In order to obtain patent protection under the law, applicants have to ﬁle applications with the relevant
authority in accordance with the formalities speciﬁed in the Patent Act. Generally, the patent lasts for a
61Id. at Part 7 of Title II.
62Section 25 of the Patent Act (No. 3) B.E. 2542 (A.D. 1999) revoked Part 7 of Title II of the Patent Act (No. 2) B.E. 2535
(A.D. 1992) on pharmaceutical patent measures. See Pharˆ atchabanyat sidthibad (chababthˆ ı 3) pho so 2542 [Patent Act (No.
3) B.E. 2542 (A.D. 1999)], available at http://www.krisdika.go.th/lawHeadPDF.jsp?formatFile=pdf&hID=1 (last visited Apr.
4, 2006).
63Kuanpoth, Patent Law, supra note 27, at 22.
64The updated 1979 Act, which incorporates all subsequent amendments, shall hereinafter refer to as the “Patent Act”. The
Patent Act is available at http://www.krisdika.go.th/lawHeadPDF.jsp?formatFile=pdf&hID=0 (last visited Apr. 4, 2006).
65Id. at sec. 5.
66Id. at sec. 65 bis.
67Id. at sec. 65 ter.
15term of twenty years from the ﬁling date of the patent application within the country.68
As in the TRIPS Agreement, the Patent Act has also speciﬁed some ﬂexibility for patent protection. The
Patent Act recognizes compulsory licensing as a remedy to the abuse of a monopoly right.69 There are also
two exceptions to the exclusive rights that directly concern the pharmaceutical industry. First, professional
pharmacists or medical practitioners may compound drugs to ﬁll a doctor’s prescription as well as use phar-
maceutical products without the consent of, or remuneration paid to, the patent holder.70 This exception
is aimed at protecting the public against a monopoly by the patent holders and preventing the medical
practitioners from infringing pharmaceutical patent in treating patients.71
The second exception is similar to the Bolar exception under the TRIPS Agreement. The Patent Act allows
applicants to ﬁle for drug registration if they intend to produce, distribute or import patented pharmaceutical
products after the expiration of the existing patent term.72 Such exception allows pharmaceutical companies
to ﬁle a drug application during the patented term and enable them to release the products immediately after
the expiration of the patent term. The provision is meant to promote competition among pharmaceutical
companies and lessen time for generic drugs to be available to the market, which will enhance public beneﬁt.73
68Id. at sec. 35.
69Jakkrit Kuanpoth, Major issues in the Thai patent system, http://www.thailawforum.com/articles/jakpat6.html (last
visited Feb. 12, 2006).
70Kuanpoth, Patent Law, supra note 27, at 312; Patent Act, supra note 64, at sec. 36 para. 2(3).
71Kuanpoth, Patent Law, supra note 27, at 312.
72Patent Act, supra note 64, at sec. 36 para. 2(4).
73Kuanpoth, Patent Law, supra note 27, at 314.
16III.
Potential Issues from the U.S. -Thailand FTA Negotiations Re-
garding Pharmaceutical Patent Protection and Their Assessment
No oﬃcial public disclosure on the details of the U.S.’s proposals regarding pharmaceutical patent protection
is now available to the public. However, as suggested in the EAI, the U.S. - Thailand FTA will be based on
the U.S. – Singapore FTA model and the U.S. made its stance clear that it will negotiate for TRIPS-plus
protection. Therefore, I will evaluate the major potential issues based on the terms agreed to in the U.S. –
Singapore FTA, which was begun on November 16, 2000 and concluded on January 15, 2003. The U.S. –
Singapore FTA was the ﬁrst FTA the U.S. entered with an ASEAN country under the EAI.74
Since both the U.S. and Thailand have to comply with the minimum standards of patent protection stipu-
lated under the TRIPS Agreement, the main potential issues of the negotiation focus on around the ﬂexibility
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, such as compulsory licensing provisions and parallel importation mecha-
nism. The TRIPS Agreement leaves room for countries to adjust the level of compliance to their own needs.75
74Oﬃce of the United States Trade Representative, Quick Facts: U.S. – Singapore Free Trade Agreement, May 6, 2003,
http://www.ustr.gov/Document Library/Fact Sheets/2003/Quick Facts US-Singapore Free Trade Agreement.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 28, 2006).
75Rahul Rajkumar, The Central American Free Trade Agreement: An End Run Around the Doha Declaration on TRIPS
and Public Health, 15 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 433 (2005).
17A.
Extension of the Term of Patent Protection
1.
Changes to the Rules
The ﬁrst major issue that is likely to be proposed by the U.S. under the FTA is the indirect extension of
patent protection term. The term of patent protection under Thai law corresponds with that of the TRIPS
Agreement, which is not less than twenty years. No extension is possible under both bodies of rules.
Under the U.S. – Singapore FTA, however, a patent term may be extended beyond the presumed twenty year
period in many cases.76 First, the patent holder may request for a three or ﬁve year extension of the patent
term, as the case may be, to compensate for unreasonable delays in granting the patent.77 The second case
is where patent is to be granted based on the examination of the invention conducted in another country. If
such other country experiences delay in issuing the patent and extends the patent term, the patent holder
may also request for up to ﬁve years of extension in the ﬁling country.78 Last, an extension of the patent
term for a pharmaceutical product is also possible for unreasonable curtailment of the patent term due to
the marketing approval process.79
76The U.S. – Singapore FTA does not specify the patent term, but it was presumed to be twenty years as the provision bases
on the TRIPS Agreement. See Oxfam International, Oxfam Brieﬁng Note: Undermining Access to Medicines: Comparison of
Five US FTAs 4 (2004), http://www.oxfamamerica.org/newsandpublications/publications/briefing papers/art7360.html
(last visited Mar. 12, 2006).
77United States – Singapore Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., Jan. 15, 2003, art. 16.7(7),
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade Agreements/Bilateral/Singapore FTA/Final Texts/Section Index.html (last visited Mar.
16, 2006) [hereinafter U.S. – Singapore FTA].
78Id. at art. 16.7(8).
79Id. at art. 16.8(4)(a).
182.
Assessment
As mentioned in Part II, the basic underlying principle of patent protection is the balance between the beneﬁt
of the inventors and the general public. The “inventors” who gain the beneﬁt of patent protection in the
pharmaceutical industry are the pharmaceutical manufacturers. The temporary monopoly granted to these
manufacturers is meant for them to earn beneﬁts in compensation for the high research and development
costs incurred in developing new drugs. The companies are expected to invest more in pharmaceutical
research and development with the high beneﬁts they earn during the monopoly.
Accordingly, the question arises on how long is appropriate for these pharmaceutical manufacturers to have
a monopoly. For developing countries, the longer pharmaceutical patent protection is granted to the patent
holders, the slower the cheaper generic versions of patented drugs will be made available to the market. A
prolonged time might result in unnecessary suﬀering or death especially to those countries that cannot aﬀord
expensive drugs.80
From Thailand’s standpoint, the objective of patent protection in encouraging more research and develop-
ment will not be achieved with a long monopoly period, as most of the parties gaining beneﬁt from patent
protection are foreigners. A study basing on two thousand four hundred and forty-four patent applications
ﬁled from 1992-2002 in Thailand shows that most patent applicants are foreigners, comprised mostly of
Americans, Germans, Japanese, Swiss and Swedish, with only one point three one percent of Thais. Ninety-
eight points zero eight percent are applications ﬁrst ﬁled in other country. The ﬁgures reﬂect that the
80Oxfam International, supra note 76, at 6.
19research and development that leads to patent registration does not occur in Thailand, nor is it conducted
by Thais.81 Longer patent protection will instead be an obstacle for Thais to access to data necessary for
creating new inventions.
Moreover, pharmaceutical sales in Thailand contributed only a small portion of the total global sales. The
U.S. pharmaceutical companies make eighty-eight point ﬁve percent of their sales from markets of North
America, Europe and Japan. The trivial proﬁt gained from the Thai market does not contribute much to the
research and development of these companies.82 Major companies in the pharmaceutical industry also spend
nearly three times as much on marketing and administration as on research and development. They usually
proﬁt twice more than what they have invested in the tax-deductible research and development.83 Thus,
the argument that pharmaceutical companies need long patent protection in gaining proﬁt and encouraging
research and development of new drugs has no weight when applied to the developing countries’ context.
Each pharmaceutical manufacturer will also have the best knowledge on the products it developed. If they
are able to further improve the technology into new invention, new patent with a new term of protection
may be granted.84 In many cases, delays on patent issuance also result from the applicants themselves in
not proceeding with the patent examination ﬁlings.85 Therefore, the extension of patent term is deemed
unnecessary.
Taking into account the idea that all property rights have duration, property rights in tangible goods last
with the physical toleration of the subject matter, while intangible property like a patent lasts according to
the average length of time society frames for such property, which may vary by the diﬀerent areas of innova-
tion.86 Most patent laws, however, use a uniform average term of patent protection they deem appropriate
81Limpananont, supra note 56.
82Bilaterals.org, supra note 11.
83Id.
84Kuanpoth, Patent Law, supra note 27, at 217.
85Limpananont, supra note 56.
86Carvalho, supra note 30, at 378.
20for all areas of technology for practical purpose.87 Thus, since the WTO member countries have negotiated
and agreed upon the twenty year term of patent protection under the TRIPS Agreement, such term should
be used as the base line for pharmaceutical patent protection without any direct or indirection extension.
B.
Restrictions on Compulsory Licensing and Data Exclusivity
1.
Changes to the Rules
Compulsory licensing is the situation where the government allows a third party to produce the patented
product or utilize the patented process without the patent holder’s consent.88 The TRIPS Agreement and
the Doha Declaration allow each member country to determine the grounds for compulsory licensing, in
support of public health beneﬁts. For Thailand, compulsory licensing under Thai law may be applied when
the patented process is not being used in the country or the patented product is not produced or sold, or is
sold at an unreasonably high price, or the supply does not meet public demand within the country without
any legitimate reason.89 The latest amendment to the Patent Act in 1999 also allows the government to
exercise compulsory licensing in case of severe drug shortage or for other public interest protection, which is
87Id. at 378.
88WTO, Fact Sheet, supra note 42.
89Patent Act, supra note 64, at art. 46.
21a broad ground for utilizing compulsory licensing.90
On the contrary, the proposals of the U.S. through the FTA set more rigid grounds and conditions to use
compulsory licensing. The U.S. – Singapore FTA limits compulsory licensing application only to cases where
there are anti-competition practices; public, non-commercial use; or national emergency or circumstances
of extreme urgency.91 Besides the limited grounds, the compensation standard for the use of compulsory
licensing set under the FTA, being “reasonable and entire compensation”, is also higher than that of the
TRIPS Agreement, where “adequate remuneration” must be paid to the patent holders.92 Parties to the
FTA also cannot request for the transfer of relevant undisclosed information or technical know-how from the
patent holder.93
A further hurdle to the use of compulsory licensing laid down as the U.S. - Singapore FTA requires stringent
test data exclusivity and prevents generic manufacturers from obtaining market approval prior to the expira-
tion of the patent term. Under the FTA, parties must provide a ﬁve year period of protection for information
concerning the safety and eﬃcacy of a pharmaceutical product submitted for marketing approval anywhere
in the world. They shall not allow third parties to market the same or similar products during the speciﬁed
period of time without the consent of the information provider.94 Article 16.8(3) of the FTA also speciﬁes
that the test data protection must be upheld even if the patent protection is already terminated. Thai law
does not have such restriction and it complies with the minimum TRIPS Agreement standard. Article 39.3
of the TRIPS Agreement only requires the member countries to protect data against unfair commercial use,
which is not interpreted extensively to include data exclusivity.95 The government can still use such data in
90Id. at art. 51.
91U.S. – Singapore FTA, supra note 77, at art. 16.7(6); See Oxfam International , supra note 76, at 10.
92U.S. – Singapore FTA, supra note 77, at art. 16.7(6); TRIPS, supra note 43, at art. 31(h); See Oxfam International, supra
note 76, at 10-11.
93U.S. – Singapore FTA, supra note 77, at art. 16.7(6).
94More details in U.S. – Singapore FTA, supra note 77, at art. 16.8.
95Rajkumar, supra note 75.
22considering the marketing approval for the same product for other companies.96
2.
Assessment
The proposal of the U.S. for harder implementation of compulsory licensing and strict data exclusivity
protection are much criticized by the global community. Compulsory licensing is one of the key ﬂexibility
provisions that developing and least-developed countries depend upon to protect its public health system,
especially when there is a high demand for a drug. For instance, Brazil was able to negotiate with multi-
national pharmaceutical companies for aﬀordable anti-retroviral drugs through the threat of compulsory
licensing.97
The more stringent grounds for compulsory licensing and higher compensation paid to the patent holders
under the U.S. – Singapore FTA are restrictions which undeniably beneﬁt pharmaceutical manufacturers
in developed countries. Data from the World Health Organization (WHO) shows that of the ten largest
pharmaceutical companies that control over one-third of the three hundred billion dollars market, six of
them are based in the U.S. and four in Europe. It is also anticipated that North America, South America,
Europe and Japan will continue to dominate eighty-ﬁve percent of the world pharmaceutical market in the
twenty ﬁrst century.98 Thailand does not have a share of any advantage of such proposals.
96Jukkrit Kuanpoth, Kh ¸ toklˆ ong kˆ ankhˆ as¸ crˆ ı thai-saharad “...” panhˆ a wˆ adˆ uay “TRIPS phanˆ uak” [Thailand-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement: Issue on “TRIPS-plus”], http://www.ftawatch.org/autopage1/show page.php?t=3&s id=3&d id=3 (last visited
Mar. 24, 2006) [hereinafter Kuanpoth, Issue on “TRIPS-plus”].
97Paul J. Heald, Mowing the Playing Field: Addressing Information Distortion and Asymmetry in the TRIPS Game, 88
Minn. L. Rev. 249, 252 (2003), as cited in Rajkumar, supra note 75.
98See WHO, Pharmaceutical Industry, available at http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story073/en/index.html (last vis-
23Moreover, the U.S.’s proposal on data exclusivity and compulsory licensing provisions bars other manufac-
turers from entering the market, which are disadvantageous to the Thai public health system. With the
data exclusivity provision, generic drug companies would have to repeat the long and costly tests of the
product in obtaining marketing approval. The repetition of the tests is restrictive during emergencies and is
economically impossible as it is often too expensive to invest and gain access to a considerably small market
like Thailand.99 With the lack of competition from generic drug companies, patent holders tend to have a
monopoly period beyond the patented term and can maintain a high drug price.100 The restriction on data
exclusivity also makes it unfeasible to use compulsory licensing even if the grounds to utilize it are met.101
Generally, data exclusivity should be used in countries where a pharmaceutical patent is not properly en-
forced. Thailand has implemented a considerable pharmaceutical patenting system and the Food and Drug
Administration of Thailand has also enforced data protection during the marketing approval process for
drugs under the Trade Secret Act B.E. 2545 (A.D. 2002), which is in accordance with the requirements of
the TRIPS Agreement.102
Nonetheless, it is argued from the pharmaceutical manufacturers’ perspective that the use of compulsory
licensing and the weak data exclusivity provisions tend to deprive them from their monopoly rights and
reduce the incentive to invest in research and development, especially on diseases threatening developing
countries.103 However, to a large extent, pharmaceutical companies do not innovate only because of strong
patent protection. They often gain additional incentives, such as government subsidy for the cost of research
or favorable tax incentives, to conduct their useful inventions. The companies will basically develop new
ited Mar. 1, 2006).
99Bilaterals.org, supra note 11.
100Id.
101Oxfam International, supra note 76, at 14.
102FTA Watch Group, Kh ¸ toklˆ ong kˆ ankhˆ as¸ crˆ ı thai-saharad “...” phonkrathob t ¸ kˆ ankhaoth´ yngyˆ a
kh ¸ ng prachˆ achˆ on [Thailand-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: Eﬀect on Citizens’ Access to Medicines],
http://www.ftawatch.org/autopage1/show page.php?t=6&s id=8&d id=8 (last visited Mar. 10, 2006).
103Rajkumar, supra note 75.
24drugs in which there is a market demand for the drugs to stay in business.104 The pharmaceutical industry
already gains substantial proﬁts under the current patent protection regime. Most importantly, compulsory
licensing only come into use when there are special circumstances, such as public health emergencies, and
certain conditions protecting the patent holders are met. Thus, Thailand need not raise its patent protection
by making compulsory licensing harder to utilize. It needs only to conform to the minimum compulsory
licensing and data protection rules stipulated by the TRIPS Agreement and to uphold the Doha Declaration,
which emphasizes that member countries may use compulsory licensing mechanism for public health purposes
without the fear of trade retaliation. By complying with the TRIPS Agreement standards, pharmaceutical
companies are granted with the level of protection agreed multilaterally.
C.
Blockage of Parallel Importation
1.
Changes to the Rules
Parallel importation is a result of free trade. As the pharmaceutical industry tends to manufacture drugs
with various quality and prices to diﬀerent parts of the world,105 parallel import generally allows countries
104John Doulamis, Getting Back in the Path to Life: Negotiating the International Patent Regime to Provide Access to HIV
Medicines to Africa 33-36 (2004), http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/hutt/table of contents 2002.html (last visited Apr.
1, 2006).
105Liew Woon Yin, Intellectual Property Rights, in The United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement: Highlights and
Insights 123, 130 (Tommy Koh & Chang Li Lin eds., 2004).
25where drugs are more expensive to import cheaper drugs from another country. This import would normally
lower the price of the drugs as there is competition between the importer and the distributor of the drugs
who bought them from the manufacturer, often at a higher price.106
The legal basis for parallel importation lies on the exhaustion doctrine, whereby the exclusive rights relating
to commercialization over a product will be exhausted “by the ﬁrst act of introduction into the commercial
circuit of the product incorporating the claimed invention.”107 The universal concept is that once a product
is sold in a country with consent, the patent holder will lose its exclusive right to control the sale of such
product within the country. This is known as national exhaustion.108 However, if a country applies the con-
cept of international exhaustion, the patent holder will lost its right to control further sale or importation of
the product once the patent holder sold the product anywhere in the world with consent.109 The exhaustion
doctrine aims to protect public interest and promote the use of intellectual property.110
Under Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement, members have the free choice of adopting either the national or the
international exhaustion doctrine, meaning they can decide whether parallel imports are allowable.111 The
Thai Patent Act adopts the international exhaustion doctrine to promote parallel importation and compe-
tition in drug prices.112 On the contrary, the U.S. – Singapore FTA concluded to grant patent holders with
the right to bring an action against a person who, without their consent, procures patented pharmaceutical
product knowing or having reason to know that such product has been distributed in breach of a licensing
agreement. This is regardless whether such breach takes place inside or outside the country,113 which deters
106Doulamis, supra note 104, at 40.
107Carvalho, supra note 30, at 108.
108Doulamis, supra note 104, at 40-41.
109Id. at 40-41.
110Kuanpoth, Patent Law, supra note 27, at 324.
111Krithpaka Boonfueng, Parallel Imports in Pharmaceuticals: Increase Access to HIV Drugs,
http://www.thailawforum.com/articles/hivdrugs1.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2006).
112Id.; Kuanpoth, Issue on “TRIPS-plus”, supra note 96.
113U.S. – Singapore FTA, supra note 77, at art. 16.7(2); Liew, supra note 105, at 123, 130.
26the use of the international exhaustion doctrine.114
2.
Assessment
Similar to the case of compulsory licensing, parallel importation is another ﬂexibility that allows develop-
ing and least-developed countries access to cheaper drugs, despite patent protection. There is no doubt
that pharmaceutical manufacturers will push hard for restrictions on parallel importation as it reduces their
proﬁt.
There are several arguments for Thailand to uphold parallel importation. For countries with low technologi-
cal advancement like Thailand, parallel importation is an important alternative for access to a cheaper drug
supply from other countries in case of a public health crisis. Compulsory licensing might be meaningless
as Thailand has limited capacity and capability to manufacture drugs.115 Parallel importation can also be
carried out ﬂexibly, as there is not much government intervention or approval in the process.116 Its use is
justiﬁed because the patent holders have already received the beneﬁt from the ﬁrst sale of their products.117
The mechanism is also viewed as a help to reduce the trade of counterfeit drugs as consumers will buy
genuine parallel imported drugs rather than fake ones.118 Thus, the beneﬁts of parallel importation are still
signiﬁcant for the protection of the Thai public health system.
114Kuanpoth, Issue on “TRIPS-plus”, supra note 96.







Finding the Right Balance
From the few main issues discussed above, it is apparent that the core debate on pharmaceutical patent
protection lies between arguments protecting the beneﬁts of the pharmaceutical manufacturers, which mostly
are from the developed countries, and those arguing in favor of “purchasers” of the products, comprised
largely of the developing and least-developed countries. Having a strong and inﬂuential pharmaceutical
manufacturing industry, there is no doubt that the U.S. will and should propose provisions that will support
its growing industry.
Numerous other proposals of the U.S. under the FTA clearly reﬂect the above notion. For instance, the
U.S. – Singapore FTA requires the parties to ratify or accede to the Patent Cooperation Treaty of 1984
(PCT),119 which aims to enable patent application and information search more convenient worldwide.120
The PCT states its purpose as “cooperation in the ﬁling, searching, and examining, of applications for
the protection of inventions, and for rendering special technical services.”121 Patent oﬃces of developed
countries may accept and review patent applications on behalf of the developing countries. However, the
non-manufacturing countries believe that the main beneﬁt of the PCT only falls on multinational companies
in having to ﬁle an application once for protection in the contracting countries,122 and there is no mechanism
119U.S. – Singapore FTA, supra note 77, at art. 16.1(2).
120Kuanpoth, Issue on “TRIPS-plus”, supra note 96.
121Markus Nolﬀ, TRIPS, PCT and Global Patent Procurement 45 (2001).
122Kuanpoth, Issue on “TRIPS-plus”, supra note 96.
28to guarantee that the beneﬁt of such countries will be taken into account in implementing the system.123
Other proposals include Article 16.7(4) of the U.S. – Singapore FTA, which makes it more diﬃcult to revoke
patents, most of which are held by companies in developed countries. The U.S. also proposes stricter en-
forcement of intellectual property violations by imposing harsher punishments and penalties.124 Thus, the
consideration is to what extent Thailand should and would be able to accept those proposals considering the
status quo and development trend of the country’s pharmaceutical industry.
2.
Negotiating for TRIPS-plus Position
As discussed, most of the U.S.’s proposals are TRIPS-plus provisions. How legitimate and appropriate it is
for countries to negotiate TRIPS-plus provisions remain controversial since the standpoint and beneﬁts of
diﬀerent countries often move in diﬀerent directions.
Looking back on the U.S. history, in August 2002, President Bush signed the Trade Promotion Authority into
law, granting the U.S. government the power to negotiate “Fast Track” trade agreements and present them
to the Congress for approval without any amendment made to the agreements.125 The Bush administration
accordingly moved to engage in bilateral and regional trade agreements for a higher level of intellectual
property protection than is stipulated under the TRIPS Agreement. The U.S. Trade Representative, Robert
123Id.
124Id.
125Western Hemisphere Department, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, An Insider’s Guide to Trade Promotion Authority and the
Trade Act of 2002 (2002), http://www.summit-americas.org/Quebec-Trade/Insider’s%20Guide%20to%20TPA%20(English).doc
(last visited Mar. 23, 2006).
29Zoellick, justiﬁed the approach from the failures of the WTO process, such as the unsuccessful rounds of
Cancun negotiations.126
Having more direct leverage in terms of market size as well as economic and political power over their trad-
ing parties in bilateral and regional negotiations, the U.S. has successfully negotiated TRIPS-plus protection
through these agreements, which became new standards of protection for latter negotiations.127 It is left to
the counter parties of these FTAs to accept or compromise for TRIP-plus provisions.
3.
Legitimacy of the Thai FTA Negotiation Practice
Another broader aspect of the FTA negotiation that I would like to discuss concerns the practice of the
Thai authority in negotiating FTAs. Under the current practice, the FTA negotiating process in Thailand
is determined by the government,128 with the Department of Trade Negotiations, Ministry of Commerce as
the lead agency responsible for conducting studies and taking action involving FTA negotiations. The Thai
government does not have to obtain approval from the Parliament to enter into an FTA, nor does it have to
disclose the details of the negotiation to the public.
Entering into multilateral and bilateral agreements directly aﬀects the sovereignty of a country in determining
appropriate policies. A comprehensive FTA such as this between the U.S. and Thailand will no doubt have a
126Rajkumar, supra note 75.
127Id.
128Limpananont, supra note 56.
30widespread eﬀect on national interests in trade, economic and social structure as well as the legal framework
of Thailand. The question is raised whether the Thai legal regime grants such a broad decision making
power to the government.
Paragraph 2 of Section 224 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand (Constitution) requires that
“A treaty which provides for a change in the Thai territories or the jurisdiction of the State or requires the
enactment of an Act for its implementation must be approved by the National Assembly.”129 Accordingly,
academia and relevant parties argue that FTA negotiations should fall within the scope of such Section where
approval from the Parliament is required.
Through rigid interpretation, there are ways to get around Section 224. The Constitution states that the
“treaty” which needs approval must be one that requires the enactment of an Act to implement it. Therefore,
if current laws are amended to be in compliance with the terms of FTA to be negotiated beforehand, or if it
is interpreted that current law is not contrary to the FTA provisions, no law needs to be enacted and, thus,
the requirement of Section 224 is not met.130 There are also attempts to interpret “a change in the Thai
territories” to cover only the geographical change of Thai territory. This means that the eﬀect of the FTA
on the administrative, judiciary and legislative sovereignty of the country does not falls under Section 224
and no approval from the Parliament is required to enter into the FTA.131
Some also argue that since Thailand is a dualist country, implementation of the FTA can only be done by
amending or issuing laws and regulations under the consideration of Parliament.132 Parliament does not
129Translation of the Constitution enacted on Oct. 11, B.E. 2540 (A.D. 1997) is available at
http://www.krisdika.go.th/pdfPage.jsp?page=eng&type=laws&lawType=law1&lawCode=%25c306&lawID=%25c306-10-2540-A0001
(last visited Mar. 20, 2006).
130Charoen Kumpephab, Amnˆ adathipatai kab kˆ anthamkh¸ ctkˆ ankhˆ as¸ crˆ ı (FTA) [Sovereignty and the Creation of Free Trade
Area (FTA)], http://www.ftawatch.org/autopage1/show page.php?t=5&s id=3&d id=3 (last visited Apr. 7, 2006).
131Id.
132Somkiat Tangkitvanich, Kh ¸ sangk¸ cd bˆ angprakˆ an t ¸kˆ an` eh¸ crˆ a` ehˆ a FTA thai-saharad “...” l¿ ` ehˆ odfˆ akkhid samhrab radthabˆ an
31have to enact or amend a law if they conclude that the FTA will have a detrimental eﬀect on the country.
Nonetheless, this proposed argument does not have much weight as it is an ex post review and Thailand
will have to face sanctions from the international arena if it does not upheld provisions of the agreements it
enters with other countries.133
I share the view that FTA negotiations must be subject to the approval of Parliament. Parliament, which
is the direct representative of the people, must have the authority to scrutinize FTA provisions to uphold
the interests of diﬀerent groups of people, especially on issues that deal with the public health such as
pharmaceutical patent protection. Parliament can also help cross check the stance of the negotiators and
share responsibility with the government if FTAs cause any unforeseeable negative impact on the country.134
Concluding Proposals for Thailand Negotiation Position
FTA negotiations between the U.S. and Thailand on pharmaceutical patent protection are contentious be-
cause the two countries have a direct conﬂict of interests on the issue. The proposals from the U.S. to uphold
beneﬁts for its pharmaceutical manufacturing industry are certainly in conﬂict with the interests of Thais,
who are mainly purchasers of the drugs. The more stringent pharmaceutical patent protection proposed by
the U.S., such as the longer patent term protection or blockage of parallel importation, results in a stronger
monopoly power of the manufacturers. Without competition, the cost of medicine increases and Thais have
less access to medicines. The sociological and economical impact of the FTA on the Thai public health
regime is large. Thus, Thailand must ready itself before stepping into the negotiation arena.
l¿ prachˆ achonthai [Certain Remarks on the Thailand-U.S. FTA Negotiations and Considerations for the Thai Government
and People], Jan. 13, 2006, http://www.ftadigest.com/articleTUSFTAremark.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2006).
133Id.
134Id.
32The critical step towards negotiation is good preparation. In order to achieve the purpose of FTA in trading
on a country’s comparative advantage, Thailand has to analyze the aspects of the FTA and prepare a com-
prehensive strategy prior to the negotiation.135 FTAs are often long, complex and ﬁlled with complicated
matters. Thailand should develop professional expertise and relevant resources in preparing to negotiate
with a repeated player like the U.S. Technical issues like pharmaceutical patent protection require extensive
study and empirical data in support of any proposed changes to be made to the rules.
Transparency of the FTA negotiation is another major point that the Thai government should encourage.
No law requires the government to disclose details of the negotiations to the public. However, the public
voice can be a good reﬂection of the issues and can help increase leverage on the negotiation. NGOs are
viewed as one of the main driving forces that helps highlight the impact of intellectual property protection
issues on public health.136 Many countries have also used public disapproval as an excuse for declining FTA
proposals. For instance, when India was pressured to amend its drug patent law, it conducted public hearing
and coordinated with the academia and NGOs to debate the eﬀect of such an amendment on the country’s
public health and pharmaceutical system. It then used public disapproval as an excuse not to follow the
proposals.137 Thus, information disclosure is among the key factors that may help to improve the eﬃciency
of FTA negotiations.
Concurrently, in order to compete with the world and open up the market, Thailand must strengthen its
pharmaceutical industry. The government may use tax incentives to motivate pharmaceutical research and
development, and encourage more training and education to help develop technical skills of personnel in
the area.138 Since the industry is not yet technologically developed, applying the TRIPS-plus provisions
will deprive the country of the ﬂexibility to design its intellectual property system in its early stages of
135Limpananont, supra note 56.
136Rajkumar, supra note 75.
137Limpananont, supra note 56.
138Siripen Supakankunti et al., Impact of the World Trade Organization TRIPS Agreement on the Pharmaceutical Industry
in Thailand, 79 Bulletin of the WHO 461, 469 (2001).
33development.139 Thailand should maintain as much ﬂexibility as is available under the TRIPS Agreement
and utilize existing exceptions for the beneﬁt of the Thai public health system.
While it is necessary to provide patent protection for the pharmaceutical companies, the minimum protec-
tion required under the TRIPS Agreement is already a good compromise for all parties involved. As of the
status quo, Thailand may either request that TRIPS-plus provisions be negotiated multilaterally by refusing
to include them as one of the topics in the FTA negotiations,140 or request for an extended implementation
period. The latter option might be a good driving force for the government and all relevant parties concerned
with reform of the Thai pharmaceutical industry.
The short term cost for complying with the FTA negotiations on pharmaceutical patent comprises mainly
of the cost in amending relevant laws and adjusting the administration to implement them.141 Nonetheless,
the long term cost of having more stringent patent protection that does not correspond with the Thai phar-
maceutical industry growth is very detrimental. Racing for increase in trade and investment is undeniably
important; however, it should not be exchanged for national interests like the Thai citizens’ public health
guarantee, the basic right of which is assured under the Constitution.142 Thailand faced trade retaliation
pressures during the Uruguay round of negotiations to amend the patent protection and now history repeats
itself in the form of an FTA. Lessons should be learned and the government should show its willingness to
uphold the interests of the country. Singapore took four years to conclude the FTA with the U.S. and about
thirteen years for Australia.143 Thus, Thailand must not rush in making crucial decisions that deal with
fundamental aspects of the economy and society.
139TDRI, supra note 4, at 100.
140Limpananont, supra note 56.
141TDRI, supra note 4, at 101.
142Limpananont, supra note 56.
143Supara Janchitfah, Free Trade Could Cost Plenty, Bangkok Post, Feb. 12, 2006, at Perspective.
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